tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5593026103512648416.post7046227952817759920..comments2024-03-05T05:13:14.325-08:00Comments on A Meaningful Life, A Better World: Ed Yong on InsectsMatt Ballhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12389020149472026193noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5593026103512648416.post-8924777538169378162023-07-04T05:38:00.979-07:002023-07-04T05:38:00.979-07:00I think that, *if* we're not in a simulation, ...I think that, *if* we're not in a simulation, then we can find the neural correlates to consciousness (e.g., by disrupting / manipulating them). But I think it is probable that we can't *know* why that neural set up *feels* like something. <br />If we're in a simulation, then we can't prove / know anything, not even the laws of physics.<br />"Phenomenal consciousness" is physical because it is driving my fingers to type musings about phenomenal consciousness. <br />By my read, humans have a long history of wanting things to be "more" than just matter and energy. Matt Ballhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02137415162558919893noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5593026103512648416.post-83362918252717644172023-07-03T13:41:51.777-07:002023-07-03T13:41:51.777-07:00But do you think this fact (i.e.that conscious exp...But do you think this fact (i.e.that conscious experience is *in principle* unobservable, and is the only phenomenon known for certain to exist that is *in principle* unobservable) calls standard physicalism into question?<br /><br />I mean, in what sense is conscious experience, which is what the philosophers call "phenomenal consciousness", physical? If it's *in principle* unobservable, has no volume or mass (or location?), and has a true, ontic existence, then in what sense is it physical?<br /><br />This is why I believe physicalism is a logically untenable metaphysical worldview.Ryan Clarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02626548873379732761noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5593026103512648416.post-1976945630753556942023-07-02T07:51:37.957-07:002023-07-02T07:51:37.957-07:00Hi Ryan,
Short answer: No. I don't think we ca...Hi Ryan,<br />Short answer: No. I don't think we can prove anything like that. we could be in a simulation where our consciousness (and its contents) are all that is "real." (Sam Harris has talked a lot about this.)Matt Ballhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02137415162558919893noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5593026103512648416.post-67341724568537629072023-07-02T07:12:22.866-07:002023-07-02T07:12:22.866-07:00Do you think it will ever be possible, even in pri...Do you think it will ever be possible, even in principle, to empirically prove whether anything other than oneself is conscious, and therefore capable of subjective suffering?Ryan Clarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02626548873379732761noreply@blogger.com